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Abstract 
 
This article examines the dynamics of voluntary return migration to the Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq (KRI) in the post-Saddam period and provides a contextualized analysis of the 
returnees’ experiences in a rapidly shifting geopolitical situation in Kurdistan. It specifically 
focuses to examine how diasporans’ motivations to return as well as their plans to re-return 
are shaped in relation to their experiences in host societies and in ‘homeland’. Drawing from 
qualitative interviews, it shows that Kurdish diasporans’ return can be characterized as 
‘diasporic homecoming’ as it is motivated by the desire to contribute to the economic and 
political development of the KRI. However, the mismatch between expectations and 
‘homeland’ realities combined with positive experiences and social capital accumulated in 
the host country makes plans for re-return more foreseeable and less risky. 
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Introduction 
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This article examines the return migration to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in the 2000s. 
It sheds light to the returnees’ motivations to return to Kurdistan in the post-Saddam era as 
well as to their pre- and post-return experiences and how those affect plans to re-return. Since 
the 1980s, the Iraqi Kurdish migration to Europe and North America has mainly been 
conflict-generated due to experienced ethnic persecution and lack of human security in the 
context of war and political instability. After having formed vibrant diaspora communities, 
thousands of Kurds have returned temporarily or permanently to the region since the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 by American-led forces and since the establishment of a semi-state structure 
in Kurdistan (Crowcroft, 2014; Voller, 2014; Paasche, 2016a).1 The KRI has experienced a 
significant economic boom in the 2010s and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has 
become a prominent actor in the Middle East after 2003, when the Ba’athist regime’s reign 
terminated and the Kurdish political actors replaced its political institutions (Aziz, 2011: 79). 
This has led to numerous diaspora members, who were forced to flee the region due to a 
series of genocidal campaigns (such as Al-Anfal), political instability and even war, to return 
to the region in the post-Saddam era (Voller, 2014; Paasche, 2016a).  
 
However, the newly erupted war between the KRG and the so-called Islamic State (IS) has 
presented new dynamics for migration to and from the region. Thousands of young Kurds 
have left the region due to the on-going conflict, which shows that while diasporans are 
returning many locals also dream of leaving Kurdistan (Mhamad 2015). The eventuality of an 
independent Kurdish state since the declaration of the de facto Kurdish state in 1991 seems to 
never have been as topical as it is now with the failing state of Iraq (Bengio 2012; Aziz 2011; 
Leezenberg 2005). The KRG held a referendum for independence in September 2017, 
                                                
1 Reliable data on the number of returnees, re-returnees or those, who have opted for circular 
migration to and from the KRI is lacking.  
 3 
evoking reactions from its neighbors Turkey, Iran and Syria as well as from the central Iraqi 
government. This will surely affect KRG’s political and economic situation in the long run, 
as independence claims might destabilize even further the political dynamics in the region 
(Kaya and Whiting, 2017). This also means that the voluntary return of diasporans, who have 
spent years outside Kurdistan might not be sustainable and permanent in the long run. 
 
In this paper, we ask: What has motivated the return migration of Iraqi Kurdish diasporans to 
the KRI in the post-Saddam period? How do their pre-return experiences shape decision-
making processes concerning return? And, how do both pre- and post-return experiences play 
into plans of a possible re-return? This study on Iraqi Kurdish return migration provides a 
compelling case to examine diaspora members’ return to a post-conflict context that is highly 
volatile. It allows shedding light to the dynamics of return migration by examining what role 
pre-return experiences play in decisions of return, but also how they together with post-return 
experiences affect plans of eventual re-return. The article is based on fieldwork conducted in 
2016. The material consists of qualitative, semi-structured interviews conducted with 
voluntary and non-assisted returnees to the KRI from ten different host countries in Europe 
and North America. It provides insights to diasporans’ motivations to return in a context of 
active nation-state building processes in the ‘homeland’, and on how their experiences both 
before and after return affect plans to stay or to re-return. The findings show that plans to opt 
for re-return to host society were largely shaped by the mismatch between the expectations 
associated with a diasporic homecoming and the realities on the ground, with the latter being 
contrasted to positive experiences in the host countries. The following sections include a 
literature review on relevant empirical and theoretical studies on return migration, a section 
on methodology and the data collection procedures and the analysis sections that present the 
central findings. The article ends with a discussion on the policy relevance of the findings. 
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Return as Diasporic Homecoming 
 
Research on return migration has exponentially increased during the last decade or so, 
although certain sub-themes have drawn more attention than others, including the decision to 
return, post-return reintegration and reverse cultural shock (Carling et al., 2011). One of the 
major themes of interest in return migration literature concerns the motivations for return 
migration, and in which cases the intentions to return concretize into an actual return to 
homeland (de Haas, 2005; Carling et al., 2011). Scholars have focused on factors such as age 
and generation (King and Christou, 2014), economic opportunities and investments (Tsuda, 
2009a), family ties or other personal motivations (Emanuelsson, 2008; Jain, 2013) and 
transnational ties and engagements (see Carling and Pettersen, 2014) to better understand the 
link between the possibilities and intentions of return and the actual return to homeland. More 
recently, it has been posited that the impact of host society integration (de Haas and 
Fokkema, 2015; Di Saint Pierre et al., 2015), in other words the social and economic 
conditions in the host country, including discrimination, failed labour market integration and 
feelings of non-belonging, might also motivate return migration.  
 
Reasons to leave the ‘homeland’ can also play into motivations to return. Whereas the 
empirical research literature on return rarely distinguishes between that by labour migrants 
and those of forced migration movements, we can say that the return dynamics are not similar 
to these two types of migration patterns. Although it is difficult to categorize return 
motivations to a post-conflict region in a clear-cut manner as different motivations often 
intertwine, Tsuda (2009a: 21) argues that ‘despite its fundamentally instrumental economic 
basis, diasporic return continues to be more ethnically driven and emotionally charged than 
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other types of labour migration.’ For instance, several case studies (Gerhartz, 2010; Fehler, 
2011; Saar, 2017) show that identity-driven motivations and feelings of belonging to the 
‘homeland’ play a role in return decisions in the first but also in the second generation. On 
the other hand, in the context of active nation-building, identity-driven or nationalist reasons 
to return to ancestral ‘homeland’ can also play a major role in return decisions and desires to 
contribute to local development processes (Gerhartz, 2010). The motivations of voluntary 
return by forcibly displaced diasporans, as is the case with the Iraqi Kurdish diaspora, to a 
post-conflict society that is in the stage of active nation-building, remains largely 
understudied. 
 
How can such ‘ethnically driven and emotionally charged’ return be better understood, 
without essentialising return as a mere reflection of lingering ethnic loyalties and yearnings? 
Markowitz and Stefanson (2004: 3-4) refer to ‘homecomings’, drawing from Brah’s (1996) 
notion of the ‘homing desire’. They suggest that return is not merely a nostalgic belonging to 
a homeland, to the past condition or a defensive response to the stigmatization in the host 
society, but that the return can become a project that opens doors to the future. However, the 
return is not always frictionless and the returnees can find themselves struggling with 
reintegration if realities on the ground drastically differ from their expectations. Besides host 
country experiences and how those are reflected in return decisions, more and more is known 
about returnees’ individual experiences and the mismatch between their expectations and the 
realities they face in the homeland (Eriksson-Baaz, 2015: 24). As mentioned earlier, prior 
research has established that decisions to return can be shaped by expectations of what awaits 
in the ‘homeland’ as well as by diasporans’ experiences of the host country. We suggest that 
pre-return experiences in the host country together with post-return experiences in 
‘homeland’ affect decisions to stay or eventually to re-return. This means that not only 
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decisions concerning return but also re-return to host societies (or migration elsewhere) are 
shaped both by the realities in the homeland and prior experiences in the host society. Yet, 
relatively little is known of how host society experiences together with post-return 
experiences shape decisions to stay or to re-return.  
 
What can then be considered as ‘return’? As King and Christou (2011: 453) observe, there is 
a more ‘variegated and nuanced exploration of the ontology of return, stretching its meaning 
across time, space and generations, and where the ‘place’ of return and the type of movement 
can have various expressions - real, virtual, imagined, desired, forced or denied’. We 
approach ‘return’ similarly to Long and Oxfeld (2004: 4), who understand it as ranging from 
short visits to more permanent repatriation, including temporary visits and preparations for 
return. This is different from ‘return migration’ that is accompanied with the intention of 
staying permanently, whereas ‘return’ can also be provisional and include short-time visits. 
Drawing from Long and Oxfeld’s understanding of ‘return’, from Brah’s (1996) 
understanding of diasporic, and Markowitz’s and Stefanson’s understanding of 
‘homecoming’, we approach the return of Iraqi Kurds to the KRI as diasporic homecoming. 
We understand diasporic homecomings as either a provisional or more permanent return that 
is at least to some extent motivated by feelings of returning ‘home’ and willingness to 
contribute towards it, but that is also informed by both pre-migration and pre-return 
experiences in the host society, and future-orientated with the possible idea of re-return - and 
so forth.  
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Theoretically, return migration has been approached within the paradigms of 
transnationalism, diaspora and mobilities (Cassarino 2004)2. This paper draws from the 
transnational frame in the sense that it examines how decisions and motivations for return 
(and re-return) become formulated in relation to pre- and post-return experiences in both the 
national (host society, homeland) and transnational context. International migration has 
become more and more seen characterized by multi-sited transnational networks and 
mobilities, although scholars have acknowledged that the context in which the departure as 
well as the return takes place is highly important (Tsuda, 2009a: 21). The transnational frame 
provides an analytical lens to recognize how returnees make decisions in the transnational 
space, but also how their (trans)national human and social capital (skills, networks, social 
resources) shape their decisions to return, and plans to re-return.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
As return migration is dynamic and complex by nature, qualitative approaches have become a 
preferred method in migration studies (Kunuroglu et al., 2017: 7). The primary data source 
for this paper consists of 26 semi-structured interviews conducted in three main provinces in 
the KRI, namely Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Duhok in early 2016. Furthermore, in this study we 
have solely focused on voluntary, non-assisted return, where the individuals have made the 
decision to return to the ancestral homeland without the existence of a threat of deportation or 
reasons for forced return.   
                                                
2 Cassarino (2004) distinguishes five theoretical paradigms to better understand return 
migration: neoclassical approach and new economics of labour migration (NELM), structural 
approach, transnational approach and social network theory. 
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The semi-structured interview guide was prepared by the authors and interviews were 
conducted, translated from Kurdish to English, as well as transcribed and anonymised by a 
research assistant3. This data collection method allowed the interviewees to narrate their own 
individual experiences (Kunuroglu et al., 2017: 7). The interview data was then coded by the 
authors, divided in empirical categories and then re-grouped to themes each of which is 
dedicated a separate analysis section.  
[Table 1 here] 
Snowball sampling method was used in order to reach the interviewees. The authors and the 
research assistant used their previous contacts and pursued several leads so that the snowball 
sampling would not rely only on few contacts. This data collection strategy was chosen for a 
variety of reasons. Firstly, there is no official data on voluntary returns to the KRI and 
returnees are not easily identifiable via official records, making probability sampling 
unsuitable. There are also no phone or address books in the region via which we could have 
randomly contacted potential participants. Acknowledging its biases and limitations, we felt 
that the snowballing method was the most suitable one as the returnees were otherwise hard 
to locate. Despite its limitations, we aimed at creating a sample that consists of interviewees 
with diverse backgrounds in order to have a broader idea of the dynamics surrounding return 
migration, including its challenges and realities. This strategy was pursued in three different 
districts also for purposes of diversity in political views, since all districts have differing 
political profiles. As for ethical considerations, names and any identifiable features of 
research participants have been anonymised. Each participant was given a consent form 
where they agreed to an interview that would be used for research purposes. The research 
assistant explained the aims of the project and received consent before he started the 
                                                
3 This study is part of a project (anonymised) funded by (anonymised).  
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recording. Despite being assured of anonymity and careful processing of the data, some 
participants felt at unease and withdrew their consent during or after the interviews, probably 
due to the political climate in the KRI.  
 
The interviews were conducted with returnees, who had resided in the United States, Canada, 
Italy, Russia, Norway, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Denmark and the 
Netherlands at least for a decade prior to their return to the KRI. The participants were aged 
between 26 and 60 years and they had left Kurdistan between 1975 and 2002. Some of the 
interviewees were children, when their parents had left the region through either voluntary or 
involuntary migration. In this paper, we refer to them as the generation-in-between and 
approach their accounts under the category of ‘ethnic return’ suggested by Tsuda (2009a), 
referring a ‘return’ to their region of ancestral origins. The total dataset consists of interviews 
conducted with 17 men and 9 women. We aimed to sustain a gender balance in terms of the 
number of participants, yet it was challenging to find female interviewees. One reason for this 
gender imbalance could be that since our research assistant was male, the female participants 
might not have felt at ease when meeting with him one-on-one in cafes or in their homes. 
Secondly, as Emanuelsson (2008) shows in her study on return migration to the KRI, it is 
often men who first return and bring in their families afterwards. Therefore, the higher 
proportion of male interviewees reflects most likely the gendered nature of return migration 
to the region. All interviewees were given a three-month deadline to withdraw their 
interviews if they wanted to. It was also most often female interviewees, who withdrew their 
consent within the deadline.  
 
We have conducted a thematic analysis (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009) on the collected data and 
examined how the returnees narrated on their experiences and motivations to leave and to 
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return, and eventually to re-return in relation to their experiences in both the host society and 
‘homeland’. In the first part, we discuss the forced displacement from the region, and the 
context of returning to a post-conflict society experiencing nation building processes and 
economic boom. The second part deals with pre-return and post-return experiences, whereas 
the last section discusses the eventual aspirations to re-return in relation to the preceding 
sections.  
 
Diasporic Homecomings to Kurdistan  
 
Leaving the ‘Homeland’ 
Current estimates of the Kurdish population mainly from Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran 
residing in Europe place the number of Kurdish-speakers at between roughly 850,000 and 1.3 
million, with the great majority residing in Germany. Sizeable Kurdish communities also 
exists in the United Kingdom, France and the Nordic countries (Hassanpour & Mojab, 2005; 
Paasche, 2016a). The first wave of migration for Iraqi Kurds consisted in large part of highly-
educated middle-class men, who were politically active in their homeland and came from 
wealthy families. A small number of Kurdish intellectuals migrated for educational reasons 
prior to the 1970s, but the majority of the current Kurdish migration is conflict-generated. 
After 1970s, it was a variety of conflicts that drove Kurds away from their homeland. The Al-
Anfal campaigns, targeting Kurdish villages and orchestrated by Saddam Hussein in the late 
1980s, played an especially important role in generating migration from the region (See Aziz, 
2011:12). Many Kurds were accepted as asylum seekers to different countries in Europe and 
beyond (Human Rights Watch, 1991).  
 11 
Irwani (2015:42) states that it is impossible to find a single Kurdish family in the KRI, who 
had not been affected by war and forced displacement. Indeed, most participants left KRI in 
the context of politically unstable situation and insecurity. Only three interviewees mentioned 
economic reasons as their primary motivation to leave; yet such reasons were still linked to 
the political environment that had created a lack of human security and an increased risk of 
ethnic persecution. The interviewees had varying social, economic and political backgrounds, 
and among them some had been directly involved in political activities against the Saddam 
Hussein regime. As a result, their situation in the KRI grew gradually more challenging. 
However, interviewee accounts showed diversity rather than commonality concerning 
political reasons as a motivation to leave. Some mentioned that their family members 
belonged to either Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) or Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)-
affiliated peshmergas, whereas others had no connection whatsoever to political movements. 
Furthermore, the decisions to leave contained a gendered dimension. Men had usually left 
alone, and only after having settled to the host country, they had invited their families to 
accompany them. Besides one exception, all female interviewees had left with their families. 
Indeed, the decision to stay or to leave was mostly taken by men. As Binder and Tošić 
(2005:617) note, gender plays an important role in decisions to leave, and can be closely 
connected to women’s social positions as well as to the family constellation in conflict-
generation migration. In cases when the whole family left at the same time, it was usually via 
NGOs and international organizations, which had guaranteed the safe travel and facilitated 
asylum application procedures in the host country. 
Fleeing the country during wartime or in the midst of the on-going political crises was 
extremely hard, regardless of whether it was done via institutional channels (via NGOs, for 
instance) or in cases when the interviewees had used smugglers. Speaking of the related risks 
during the journey, some interviewees had been captured, arrested or detained before arriving 
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to the host society. The popular routes were to cross the border to Turkey, then to find ways 
to Greece, and from there on to other European countries. Several struggled to collect the 
money necessary to complete the journey, but those who could save a sufficient amount, 
opted to use smugglers to get out of the conflict zone.  Most usually had succeeded at the first 
attempt, but some could only reach Europe after the second or third attempt, only delaying 
the inevitable departure instead of deterring it. However, social networks played a crucial role 
in two aspects. Some had reached the smugglers through friends and family networks, and 
relied on them to cover the costly journey. Migration routes were rarely straightforward and 
usually passed through several countries before the participants had reached the country of 
settlement, although a few arrived directly from Kurdistan. Those successful to pass the 
Turkish-Iraqi border and placed in a refugee camp in Turkey, would finally found a way to 
go to Canada, Australia or the United States via international organizations such as the 
UNHCR. The pre-existing networks in the homeland were also employed in connection to 
diaspora networks in the host societies to reach the society of settlement. Individual networks 
seem to have been the most popular factor in terms of choosing the destination country; in 
cases such a choice was available. Relations to homeland political parties had made it easier 
for the politically active interviewees to cross borders and utilize the transnational (diaspora) 
networks. On the other hand, other already existing transnational networks, such as friends 
and family abroad, became facilitators during the departure process and enabled to reach 
sometimes, although not always desired destinations.  
 
I was looking to go to England, but I didn’t succeed. So I had family member, 
who lives in Holland, and he said Holland that is OK. I had never heard about 
Holland before. I had only heard about the cheese and milk…that was the only 
thing I knew about it. 
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Similar testimonies show that choices for the country of settlement were more or less 
involuntary. Some interviewees wished to go to a specific country, like the United Kingdom, 
but when they didn’t succeed due to economic or other reasons, they settled in another 
country. Testimonies also reveal that rumors circulating in the homeland had an impact on 
decisions where to go. For instance, the Netherlands was known for its ‘Kurdish-friendly’ 
and generous asylum policy, hence becoming a destination country for many.  
 
Returning to ‘Homeland’ 
 
The meaning of ‘home-coming’ was symbolically significant, since the departure had been 
involuntary in the context of forced displacement, whereas the return was voluntary. A 
majority of returnees identified the improved security situation as the main determinant for 
their return, explicitly referencing the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003, although 
they were also conscious of the growing political instability in the region. Indeed, the 
participants’ reasons to return were most often related to what we have named ‘diasporic 
homecoming’, although such reasons were often intertwined with other motivations opened 
below. We categorized return motivations that referred, on the one hand, to emotional 
attachments to Kurdistan as home, to Kurdish culture and language and to feelings of 
‘Kurdishness’ and, on the other hand, to the desires to contribute to the region as it had 
become possible in the context of improved security situation. Ten interviewees listed these 
issues as a primary motivation for return and for another ten interviewees it was a secondary 
reason. Although there was an overlap between these two motivations what could be 
categorized as “cultural” and “nationalist”, in the first case the return was motivated by 
wanting to be with people, who shared common values, language and culture, while in the 
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other one, the stress was more on selfless motivations to answer to a “homeland calling”. 
Four interviewees had returned uniquely because they wanted to ‘serve’ Kurdistan at this 
critical moment, and referred to altruistic tone and nationalist reasons to return.  
 
When you meet Kurds from Canada, USA and Europe, you see the desire that 
they want to come back and do something for Kurdistan. Because when we left, 
we knew that we have to come back. We cannot just leave it. 
 
My motivation is to develop the industry in Kurdistan, to do something in 
Kurdistan to assist people and I think this is my biggest motivation.  
 
Several returnees spoke of “cultural” reasons together with an obligation to return to the 
homeland and to contribute to its prosperity. Some testimonies also showed that returnees 
came back with their political projects to contribute to transitional justice and 
commemoration in the KRI, and to serve as “role models” for Kurdish society: 
 
I came here to teach, I was really excited about teaching. I wanted to build 
memorialization projects in Kurdistan. To contribute to research, genocide 
awareness… 
 
I said as a Kurdish woman, I can do a little bit… just put one stone in the wall of 
Kurdish improvement. It makes me happy and I think we all can have a small 
impact and in the end we will see some changes in the society. We will be role 
models, I hope.  
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The sense of duty and obligation to return ‘home’ and participate in the development of 
Kurdistan has also been identified within studies conducted on the Kurdish diasporas in 
different contexts, including on the second generation (Toivanen, 2014). Indeed, van 
Bruinessen (2000:67) has examined the relationship between exile and Kurdish nationalism 
and stated that ‘it was exile that transformed Kurdistan from a vaguely defined geographical 
entity into a political idea’. The decision concerning the diasporic homecoming, motivated by 
nationalist or culture-related reasons, takes place in the transnational, Kurdish diaspora space. 
However, how Kurdish diaspora members’ sense of obligation to contribute to ‘homeland’ 
development concretizes into an actual return has remained understudied.  
 
At times such culturalist and nationalist reasons became intertwined with economic 
motivations and business opportunities present in the region. The return migration of the Iraqi 
Kurdish diasporans in the post-Saddam period needs to be situated both in the context of 
active nation-building process but also in the context of economic development in the KRI. 
Economic reasons were given as the second most important motivation: seven participants 
claimed that they returned for better economic conditions in the KRI or they had found a 
better job than the one they had in the host society. For instance, some interviewees said that 
they found a job before they returned or they easily found one right after their arrival. Family 
connections, previous social networks and their newly acquired skills played a role in this. 
Therefore, the diasporic homecoming took place in the context of the economic boom, the 
rising political economy of the region and to the possibility to be able to contribute and 
prosper in the KRI.  
 
Indeed, the Iraqi Kurdish region experienced rapid economic growth in the post-Saddam 
period, partially in form of foreign investments, which led to a political stability without 
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comparison elsewhere in Iraq. To return and to participate in the development of Kurdistan 
had become possible after the fall of the Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003. As Eriksson Baaz 
(2015:23) argues, return is also about giving back, which means using the knowledge 
acquired in exile to contribute to the development of a post-conflict homeland. The return 
was narrated with a consciousness of the social and human capital the returnees brought with 
them: the interviewees’ motivations to return were informed by the eventuality of being able 
to contribute and make an impact in homeland development through the accumulated social 
capital from the host societies that could be put to good use in the reconstruction of the 
Kurdish post-conflict society and eventually to gain economic benefits.  
 
Lastly, family-related reasons played a significant role in decisions of return. Five 
interviewees mentioned that they returned due to family reasons: their elderly parents needed 
care and since they couldn’t migrate, their children had chosen to return to care for them. 
This was also seen as a cultural characteristic, and therefore a duty. For few, marriage was a 
motivation to return and very few also mentioned that they had had to return with their 
parents, who had made the decision. The importance of family and relatives as primary 
motivator for return has been shown in previous research on conflict-generated migration 
(Fleisher, 2008). Only one participant accounted for the ‘need for change’ and desire for 
‘adventure’ as the main motivation to return, whereas the overall material provided little 
evidence of life style-motivated migration more commonly associated with labour migration-
generated diasporas.  
 
The interviewees of this study narrated their motivations to return in relation to the stark 
contrast that existed between the involuntariness of their departure and the voluntariness and 
freedom to return. Indeed, the experience of involuntary migration and the context in which it 
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had taken place (forced displacement in the context of conflict and war) was inseparable of 
the experienced freedom of mobility manifesting in voluntary return (to the context of 
relatively peaceful and prosperous society in nation-building). This study shows that such 
dynamics of departure and return play a significant role in shaping return decisions and ought 
not be dealt separately. In addition, host society experiences together with post-return 
experiences are also essential in determining whether returnees opt to stay or to leave again.  
 
Everyday Experiences Before and After Return 
 
Away from ‘Home’: Positive Host Country Experiences 
 
Different from the experiences of economic migrants, Di Saint Pierre et al. (2015:1837) 
observe that refugees’ migration history is ‘peculiar since many of them might not have 
planned to migrate but had to leave their country due to force majeure’. This may not only 
shape the reasons to return, but also the experiences in the new society of settlement. More 
than half of the interviewees accounted that their first impressions in the host country right 
after arrival had been a cultural shock and language problems, but also feelings of 
strangeness and loneliness that persisted during the first months. Several had also felt ‘free’, 
‘impressed’ and certain that they had made the ‘right decision.’ One major issue determining 
the general well-being was the reception of the asylum status and welfare benefits. On the 
other hand, participants, who had spent a considerable time at a refugee camp, struggled and 
depicted their situation in more negative terms compared to those, who had not stayed in 
refugee camps. The traumas of the conflict clang to the interviewees for a long while: 
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I was shocked, I couldn’t compare the place I lived in, and the new place, which 
was clean, there were flowers in the streets. In the place where I used to live in 
there were daily bombings by Saddam, because of the bullets sounds I couldn’t 
sleep. In Germany during nights I asked myself ‘why there are no sounds [of 
war]? 
While the legacies of war lingered in their memory and were visible in the accounts, the 
participants had evaluated their new situation as an act of fleeing from the war. While 
acknowledging that hardships were merely a part of a transition period, some got used to the 
new environment more easily than others, namely those interviewees, who had arrived fairly 
young to the country of settlement. The generation-in-between interviewees acknowledged 
the advantage of arriving young, compared to their parents, who struggled considerably. 
Similar to previous literature on the Kurdish generation-in-between (see Toivanen, 2014), the 
interviewees felt more ‘at home’ in the society of settlement compared to their parents. 
 
Having gotten there at a very young age, we integrated very quickly, me, my 
sister and brother. So our culture and our norms and values were more Dutch or 
English than Kurdish, because we arrived there at such a young age. It took a 
long time for my parents to let go of the Kurdishness. 
 
First-generation participants also felt this divide between them and their children, and one 
interviewee even mentioned that his biggest fear had been the ‘losing Kurdish culture’ in the 
host society. For this reason, him and his family had attempted to strengthen ties with their 
contacts back in Kurdistan, but had also taken measures by sending their children to a 
Kurdish language course in order to facilitate their adaptation in case of return.  
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It is noteworthy that the overall experiences across the host societies were positive, especially 
for those settled in the United States, Canada and Sweden. Di Saint Pierre et al. (2015:1838) 
suggest that the social and cultural isolation in the host country foster return decisions. 
Contrary to this, the majority of participants finally returned due to other reasons than 
negative experiences in the host society. Only a few interviewees mentioned that they or their 
family members had experienced discrimination, in the context of rising xenophobia after 
9/11 (see Bolognani and Erdal, 2017), but also due to conflictual inter-ethnic relations in the 
host society: 
 
I haven’t experienced discrimination but my parents have… based on their 
religion, especially after 9/11. For me, the discrimination was based on being a 
Kurd, but not by Canadians. By Arabs and some other groups… 
 
I haven’t experienced it personally, but my mom, she used to wear a scarf and I 
remember that she received comments about her scarf quite a few times. They 
told her go back to her country in Holland.  
 
The rise of xenophobia in the post-9/11 era was reflected in interviewees’ experiences in the 
host countries, yet such negative experiences were not listed as a motivating factor to return. 
Whereas earlier hypothesis on return migration associate it with failed integration, more 
recently scholars have shown that the relationship is not that clear-cut. For instance, de Haas 
and Fokkema (2015) examine the relationship between positive integration and negative 
return intentions in their study on four African migrants groups in Spain and Italy. They show 
that structural integration (‘employment, housing, education, political, and citizenship rights’) 
has generally a negative effect on return intentions. However, when looking at particular 
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indicators more specifically, they notice that education has positive effect on return 
intentions, therefore countering the more assimilationist and neoclassical interpretations 
according to which negative integration would lead to return migration.  
 
This was also the case of Iraqi Kurdish returnees, who defined themselves as ‘well-
integrated’4. Whereas the lack of language skills and integration in the labour market had 
delayed their adaptation to the host country in the earliest stages of settlement, their situation 
had improved with time. After the first cultural shock and struggles to adapt, the interviewees 
listed several benefits of their host societies, including education, employment, health care, 
rule of law, justice and human rights, and the overall human security in the countries of 
settlement. Furthermore, many expressed feelings of gratitude to the host societies that had 
provided them with welfare services and opportunities:  
 
I felt safe and free. You can say anything you want. Do anything you want. [The 
Netherlands] 
 
They treated me well in two years and I am thankful to German people who 
returned me to life. (italics added) 
 
Indeed, more than half of the interviewees acquired significant human capital abroad, 
including high school diplomas as well as BA, MA and PhD degrees in engineering, 
philosophy, linguistics, management, medicine and law. Only one interviewee mentioned that 
he couldn’t get into a program, while three others said they were not interested in acquiring 
                                                
4 The interviewees referred to “integration” in relation to labour market participation, 
language learning and creation of social networks in host society. 
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degrees. As Van Houte (2014:566) rightly suggests, not all migrants benefit from their 
migration experience in these terms. However, some of the participants had already started 
from a privileged position and managed to accumulate more social capital in the host society, 
whereas others struggled more. As Tsuda (2009b:228) states ‘it is a combination of external 
host society reception and the human and social capital that immigrants possess that 
determines their socio-economic success and integration.’ However, accounting for the 
relatively high number of well-educated returnees in the sample, it seems that the human and 
social capital that has been acquired in the host societies has also enabled to return (see de 
Haas and Fokkema, 2015). A majority of the interviewees felt that the successful integration 
actually played a facilitating factor to return to Kurdistan, as the return but also the re-return 
were considered less risky due to the accumulated social and human capital.  
 
Another major facilitating factor for return were the transnational networks and contacts 
towards Kurdistan (Carling and Erdal, 2014). Very few participants were active in diaspora 
organizations, and had kept ties to homeland Kurdish political parties. One had chaired a 
diaspora organization; another one had founded various Kurdish NGOs in different European 
cities, and the rest occasionally attended protests and seminars organized by diaspora 
organizations. However, they had maintained less political transnational ties to Kurdistan 
when in host societies, by sending economic remittances or maintaining frequent contact with 
family members and relatives. Conway et al. (2009) have argued in the case of Trinidadian 
returnees that repetitive visiting plays a role in decision to return. A majority of the 
interviewees also stated that they started visiting the KRI more frequently in the post-2003 
era despite the sectarian violence that characterized the rest of Iraq.  
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Carling and Pettersen (2014) have presented a conceptual framework to better understand the 
triangular relationship between integration, transnationalism and return migration. Based on 
their study on ten major migrant groups in Norway, their analysis shows that migrants with 
strong transnational ties and weak socio-cultural integration have strongest motivations to 
return, but that it is the relative strength of integration and transnationalism that bears upon 
motivations to return. In other words, people who are strongly integrated and have strong 
transnational ties are equally likely to return as people who are weakly integrated and have 
weak transnational ties. In this study, the interviewees’ self-reported high levels of integration 
together with strong transnational ties seem to support Carling’s and Pettersen’s (2014) 
hypothesis. As we will show later, this can also play a role in plans to re-return. Overall, 
whereas the involuntary departure became contrasted to voluntary return, also the positive 
host society experiences quickly became contrasted to challenges that returnees encountered 
in the KRI. 
 
Challenges of ‘Diasporic Homecomings’ 
 
Meeteren et al. (2014) posit that post-return experiences are shaped by returnees’ ‘human 
capital, transnational contacts, social networks, socio-economic integration in the destination 
country, legal status, and gender’ (see also Cassarino, 2004). They also call for a 
contextualized theory and analysis on post-return experiences. We agree with the authors and 
suggest that besides taking into consideration the societal or political context in which the 
return takes place, both pre-return and post-return experiences play a role in determining 
whether diasporans’ opt to re-return or stay in the ‘homeland’. Whereas reuniting with 
relatives left behind and resettling in a familiar cultural environment were mentioned as the 
main benefits of return, more than a majority of interviewees mentioned that they had felt 
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‘disappointed’, ‘disillusioned’ or ‘sad’ after return. The level of disappointment also needs to 
be understood in relation to returnees’ expectations related to ‘diasporic homecoming’ and to 
their motivations to contribute to homeland development. They felt that Kurdistan was 
missing the opportunity to become a democratic country in the Middle East and not using its 
full potential despite its economic means to do so. Some returnees decided to return after 
having heard positive things from friends, family and acquaintances, but were now 
disappointed with the current situation in Kurdistan:  
 
I was sad because the Kurdish TV channels lied to us. They show us just the 
beautiful views of Kurdistan.  
 
I am so happy to see my family but the situation in Kurdistan disappointed me. 
[..] Life is more difficult than the UK. There is no law but a high level of 
corruption.  
 
Several empirical studies point towards returnees’ negative experiences with corruption and 
local power relations, feelings of frustration and disappointment in homeland context 
(Emanuelsson, 2008). This is also the case with Iraqi Kurdish return migration, as shown by 
Emanuelsson (2008) and more recently by Paasche (2016a; 2016b). For instance, Paasche 
(2016b:129) has found out that in many returnee narratives, KRG’s ruling elites appeared as 
above the rule of law and ruling the region through neopatrimonial patronage. He also 
suggests that returnees compare their return experience to pre-return experiences in the host 
countries’ political spheres that they perceive relatively more transparent and free. As he puts 
it: ‘Exposure to a different political model abroad is seen as fomenting discontent with 
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governance in Iraqi Kurdistan’ (Paasche, 2016b:129). The comparison between the KRI and 
the host countries, including the freedom of speech, had led to further disappointment. 
 
Indeed, corruption, political instability, endurance of the tribal system and nepotism were 
mentioned as the main sources of disappointment also among the interviewees of this study. 
Tsuda (2009b:253) is right to suggest that it could be the same homeland but the ‘ethnic 
homecomings’ may differ according to class, gender, status, and social capital among other 
things. Some found it hard to find employment to their liking without the locally apt forms of 
social capital, networks and connections. The lack of local forms of social capital were 
manifest particularly in form of having the “right” political networks and affiliations, and 
belonging to a family that supported a specific political party. A returnee from the education 
sector told the following: 
 
The challenge is that in the Ministry [of Education], they do not give me a job, 
they just give it to party members. And I am afraid of being fired from my job 
because I criticize the political parties too much.  
 
“There are too many obstacles. People need to depend on their connections and 
most things are based on where you have relatives.”  
 
Some others admitted that they are having ‘moral dilemmas’ in terms of adapting to the 
homeland culture after so many years. Their ‘Western’ lifestyle included certain aspects such 
as respecting the rule of law, transparency in terms of governance as well as equality of 
opportunities. Indeed, the ‘home-comers’ are not always welcomed by the local population 
that stayed behind. The relations between the locals and the returnees might become tense 
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especially if they are perceived as outsiders (Åkesson and Eriksson-Baaz, 2015:10). The KRI 
was not considered to offer an enabling environment, and several participants complained 
that their efforts were looked down if not suppressed by the locals. During the first few years 
of return there was little contact with the locals. Some interviewees did not define their 
contacts with the local population as conflictual, but admitted that there was isolation: they 
did not mix much and had their own social spaces. However, some did mention perceived 
discrimination and hostile behaviour. Two interviewees specifically mentioned that they had 
been accused of fleeing the country when the situation had been bad and that they had 
returned when this had changed. One interviewee who had recently returned from Germany 
said that he was perceived as a “traitor” because he had left when “Kurdistan needed him the 
most”. Another interviewee from the USA testified that some locals had told her that “now 
that Kurdistan has money, you are coming back from USA and Europe.” For half of the 
interviewees, there had been no tension between the locals and the new-comers. Although 
agreeing upon the potential of returnees to make significant economic and political 
contributions, another half of the returnees had experienced that the locals saw them as a 
threat to their jobs and status and considered their interventions and education too ‘Western’, 
‘foreign’ or ‘superior’. For example, one returnee had pursued his career as a university 
lecturer in the KRI, but felt that the work ethics were too different:  
 
In the first two years of my employment, I worked as I was working in Denmark. 
Therefore, there were tensions sometimes and some professors tried to sack me. 
Even outside work place, I had tensions with other people.  
 
Female interviewees accounted that they had experienced more open and freer gender 
relations in their host countries, thus leading to more problems to adapt compared to their 
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male counterparts (see Grabska, 2015:139; Emanuelsson, 2008). As one stated: ‘It is just a 
country for men here, not for women’. She reflected on her life in the United Kingdom, in 
comparison to her recent experience in the KRI, as the following: 
 
I’ve lived my whole life in there [England] so I have many positive and negative 
experiences in my life. So coming to Kurdistan I realized that it was a positive 
experience because first of all as a girl… as a single woman you are free… you 
are free to do what you want and where you want to go…so there is nobody who 
tells you don’t go out, don’t work get married you know there is no pressure over 
there. There is no pressure when it comes to social issues. I just feel that women 
there are more independent, they are encouraged to be independent, they are 
encouraged to work, to make their own living, not to care about what people say 
about them…or whether they get married or not.   
 
Another interviewee also had a story to tell: 
One day I was wearing a short skirt and the taxi driver told me he will not pick 
me up. For women it is difficult to live here… My plan was [upon return] to work 
on creating gender equality and to motivate women to be as free as men. I worked 
for that… but the government did not respond. It did not support the plan. 
 
Although a majority of the interviewees, not all had experienced disappointment and 
disillusionment upon return. Some contrasted the prevailing realities in Kurdistan with the 
situation under the Ba’ath regime where there was the constant fear of extinction. In such 
accounts, nationalist feelings and emotional attachments seemed to prevail over the political 
and economic expectations. However, the current war against IS and the international 
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conundrum also made them feel insecure in the KRI, especially since after their return, the 
situation had rapidly deteriorated, including the economic situation.  
 
Drawing from the transnational frame, Van Houte and Davids (2008:1411) emphasize ‘the 
importance of defining sustainability of return through the use of the concept of mixed 
embeddedness, and the different factors that influence this embeddedness’. They understand 
the term ‘embeddedness’ in terms of an individual finding his/her position in the society and 
feeling a sense of belonging within that society, whether it is in form of economic 
(sustainable livelihood), social (acceptance and networks) or psychosocial embeddedness 
(identity), or interrelatedly them all. In this way, they link migrants’ experiences in the host 
society to the everyday epistemologies of returnees in the post-return context. Similarly in 
this case, the everyday epistemologies prior to departure (context of forced migration), after 
the departure and settlement in host society (with positive experiences) and after the diasporic 
homecoming (with mismatch between expectations and realities) all together shaped 
returnees’ reflections on whether to stay or to leave again. Such reflections on return as well 
as on re-return also contain a gendered and generational dimension, in the sense that pre-
return and post-return experiences can be quite different for men and women, for first-
generation migrants and their descendants, as well as intersectionally so. 
 
Reflecting on the Re-Return 
 
Diasporas are often treated as agents of development and peace-building, and some states are 
known to have drafted specific diaspora strategies and ministries to attract the diasporic 
return (Ho and Boyle, 2015). However, whether the home country creates an enabling 
environment (Brinkerhoff, 2012) for such interventions is the key to understand the dynamics 
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of ‘diasporic homecomings’ and the eventual contributions it can generate. Although the 
KRG officials repeatedly welcome the return of diaspora Iraqi Kurds, the general conception 
among the returnees was that the KRG was not able not create an enabling environment for 
them to contribute to the development of Kurdistan. All the interviewees, without an 
exception, stated that the KRG had no policies for welcoming or even encouraging diaspora 
members to return. Local forms of (family) networks and social capital seemed to play a huge 
role when it came to turning the return experience into a ‘success story’, especially in the 
realm of investment and political positions. As mentioned by Åkesson and Eriksson-Baaz 
(2015:3), ‘successful return migration is not primarily dependent on the various forms of 
social, cultural and economic capital obtained abroad, but on the various obstacles posed by 
the structures encountered upon return and the returnees’ ability to transform the migrant 
capital they have attained.’ 
 
A majority of the interviewees’ accounts reflected that the return was not considered as a 
permanent, one-way move to the ‘homeland’, but that it was an on-going, open project 
towards future, and one that would eventually involve continuous transnational circulation 
(see Eastmond, 2006). Concerning the possibility to re-return to the host country, eleven 
interviewees out of twenty-six mentioned that they were planning to move back within a 
short time period, and six had settled in Kurdistan permanently. Among them, some found it 
difficult to move again due to old age or because they were married to somebody local. One 
interviewee mentioned how hard the situation was for her children in Kurdistan. Despite 
being aware of the challenges she might encounter as a woman, she says that she did not pay 
enough attention to the situation of children upon return: 
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To be honest, especially when I see my kids are suffering in school, as a mother, 
of course you rethink about return. Being a woman in this society is another 
issue…but that is a personal issue. That was my choice, I decided to come back 
but my kids… they had no choice.  
 
Five interviewees said they would decide according to the evolving situation in Kurdistan, 
especially if the war with IS continued or if the economic situation deteriorated. For instance, 
the economic situation between the moment interviewees returned and when the interview 
were conducted had changed drastically. Since 2014 the KRI has experienced an economic 
crisis one after another, partially due to the budgetary cuts to the KRG by the Iraqi 
government, which might generate re-return from the region. Indeed, a total of sixteen 
interviewees had either decided to leave or were thinking of re-returning. Four interviewees 
instead stated that they sometimes thought about the return, but at the moment of 
interviewing, they had not made any decision concerning it. When asked whether they 
regretted of having returned, a little more than half either did (10) or had mixed feelings (4) 
about it. The rest did not regret their return (12). 
 
My feelings are paradoxical. Sometimes I wish I did not come back, but another 
time I will say, coming here was much better than staying there.  
 
 So many things have changed in terms of construction, but people’s minds are 
still old. 
 
The interviewees’ accounts showed that there is a close relationship between 
transnationalism, on the one hand, and return intentions, decisions, post-return experiences 
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and the possible re-return, on the other hand (Carling and Erdal, 2014). A majority of the 
interviewees fostered attachments, travelled or intended to travel to the host countries on a 
regular basis. Only one interviewee talked about ‘burning bridges’. One of the main reasons 
for the maintenance of transnational ties were the family members and friends abroad as well 
as established businesses in the host country. Also, the accumulated human and social capital 
from the host country was considered to enable a relatively risk-free re-return to the host 
society. Indeed, the challenges of reintegration can in some cases encourage the returnees to 
‘return’ to the host society (King and Christou, 2014) or to opt for a transnational life 
arrangement between the host society and the homeland (Emanuelsson, 2008). Four 
interviewees suggested that re-return or circular return would be a preferred strategy in the 
current context (see Åkesson and Eriksson-Baaz, 2015:10). However, most saw KRG 
statements that aimed to attract return migrants to the region as a show of ‘goodwill’, since 
the realities were shadowed by corruption, nepotism and political instability. Returning with 
great aspirations and sometimes with expectations of a ‘hero’s welcome’, returnees were re-
evaluating their decisions.  
 
Similarly to Iaria’s (2014) study on Iraqi returnees, post-return transnationalism should not be 
considered as separate from pre-return transnationalism. Instead, the transnational livelihood 
strategies before return should be seen as a continuity of post-return strategies. This also 
applies to the decisions related to such strategies concerning return and re-return that need to 
be analyzed in relation to the socio-political context they take place. In this case, retaining a 
base in both countries prevailed as a preferred strategy. The citizenship in a EU country, 
United States or Canada enabled great mobility and facilitated the decision to return and to 
take the risk, similarly to Mortensen’s (2014) findings, as well as to re-return to the host 
country if the return failed. The citizenship also facilitated the arrangement of transnational 
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family life (see Emanuelsson, 2008) as in most cases the interviewees had left their family 
members in the host country to wait that they had settled securely in Kurdistan.  
 
This study’s findings show that interviewees’ motivations to leave Kurdistan stemmed from a 
combined lack of political, social and economic security, and the return was motivated by 
increased security situation in the KRI. Regardless of positive host society experiences, they 
had decided to return to Kurdistan that was undergoing an economic boom and intense 
nation-building processes, the latter still continuing strong. This was also reflected in return 
motivations that were mostly nationalist/cultural, economic and family-related. Referring to 
their return as ‘diasporic homecoming’, the returnees wished to contribute to the development 
of the KRI. Social capital acquired in the host society, host country citizenship that provided 
increased mobility and transnational capital (networks, ties) facilitated the decision to return 
to the KRI. However, interviewees were at times lacking local forms of social capital to 
reintegrate and regardless of the symbolically significant ‘diasporic homecoming’, they 
experienced a mismatch between the expectations and realities stemming from nepotism, 
corruption and more traditional gender relations that became contrasted with positive host 
society experiences. The factors that had facilitated the return decision were also felt to 
provide a security network in the case of an eventual re-return, considered by a majority.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As Åkesson and Eriksson-Baaz (2015:1) underline, ‘return is emerging as a key issue in the 
most recent policy documents on development in the European Union (EU) as well as in 
various member countries.’ Other organizations such as the UNHCR also promote return 
migration as they see repatriation as a vital part of post-conflict reconstruction. As Sinatti 
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(2015:276) suggests, discussions on return migration actually parade as a triple-win scenario, 
where the sending states benefit from returning human capital and skills, host countries 
benefit from temporary workforce and the returnees achieve better status in the homeland 
thanks to their migration experience. In the Iraqi Kurdish context, the issue has drawn 
significant attention from international organizations such as the IOM, state-linked actors and 
development aid agencies (e.g. in Finland, Norway, the Netherlands and so forth) that have 
also started investing in voluntary and assisted return programs for facilitating diaspora 
mobility towards the KRI (Emanuelsson, 2008; King, 2008). Although discursively, 
homeland political actors reference the Kurdish diaspora’s contributions and call for the 
diaspora to “return”, little arrangements are put in place to facilitate diaspora interventions.  
 
This study’s broader aim was to map the field for policy-making and future studies on (re-
)return dynamics and post-conflict reconstruction. The findings support the observation by 
Brinkerhoff (2012) that the homelands need to create an enabling environment for diasporas 
in order for them to contribute to homeland’s development and prosperity. Interviewees 
claimed that institutional support they received was scarce, referring to the lack of KRG-led 
policy in this matter. This study shows that returnees’ experiences both preceding and 
following the return bear on their decision-making processes to stay in the ‘homeland’ or to 
opt for a re-return. On the basis of this study’s findings, we suggest that reintegration 
measures in case of voluntary return would better: 1) recognize the returnees’ transnational 
human and social capital and knowhow and how that can be transformed into local forms of 
capital; 2) take the gendered and generational aspect of returnees’ pre- and post-return 
experiences into account, the possible mismatch stemming from different gender relations, 
rule of law and institutional practices, and how that affects plans for re-return; and 3) 
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acknowledge that even though diasporans might return for “ethnic” or nationalist reasons, it 
does not automatically lead to sustainable and long-term return.  
 
Voluntary returnees’ transnational mobility and (family) life arrangements rarely fit into the 
classical understanding of return to homeland as a permanent condition. Therefore, reliable 
data is needed on the number of returnees, re-returnees and those, who have opted for circular 
migration to assess to what extent the current return of diaspora Kurds is sustainable. The 
more recent political developments, namely after the independence referendum, create new 
dynamics for engagement between the KRG and its diaspora. However, in case the voluntary 
return of highly-skilled diaspora members does become sustainable, it will have a vital 
impact on post-conflict reconstruction and eventual state-building in the KRI. The social and 
human capital of returnees increases in importance for the KRI’s stability and survival in the 
midst of the on-going political conflicts and economic crises in the region.  
  
References 
Åkesson L and Baaz ME (2015) Introduction, in Åkesson, L. and Baaz, M.E. (eds.) Africa's 
return migrants: the new developers?. London: Zed Books Ltd. 
Aziz M (2011) The Kurds of Iraq: ethnonationalism and national identity in Iraqi Kurdistan. 
London: IB Tauris. 
Bengio O (2012) The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers.  
Binder S and Tošić J (2005) Refugees as a particular form of transnational migrations and 
social transformations: Socioanthropological and gender aspects. Current Sociology, 
53(4): 607-624. 
 34 
Bolognani M and Erdal MB (2017) Return imaginaries and political climate: Comparing 
thinking about return mobilities among Pakistani origin migrants and descendants in 
Norway and the UK. Journal of International Migration and Integration, 18(1): 353-
367. 
Brah A (1996) Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities. New York: Routledge. 
Brinkerhoff JM (2012) Creating an enabling environment for diasporas’ participation in 
homeland development. International Migration, 50(1): 75-95. 
Carling J and Erdal MB (2014) Return migration and transnationalism: how are the two 
connected?. International migration, 52(6): 2-12. 
Carling J and Pettersen SV (2014) Return migration intentions in the integration–
transnationalism matrix. International Migration, 52(6): 13-30. 
Carling J, Mortensen EB and Wu J (2011) A systematic bibliography on return migration, 
Oslo: PRIO.  
Cassarino JP (2004) Theorising Return Migration: the Conceptual Approach to Return 
Migrants Revisited. IJMS: International Journal on Multicultural Societies, 6(2): 253-
279.  
Conway D, Potter RB, and St. Bernard G (2009) Repetitive Visiting as a Pre-return 
Transnational Strategy among Youthful Trinidadian Returnees. Mobilities, 4(2):249-
273. 
Crowcroft O (2014) Diaspora Returns to Build Iraq Into Next Dubai, The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/25/diaspora-returns-to-build-iraqi-
kurdistan 
 de Haas H (2005) International migration, remittances and development: myths and 
facts. Third World Quarterly, 26(8): 1269-1284. 
 35 
Di Saint Pierre F, Martinovic B and De Vroome T (2015) Return wishes of refugees in the 
Netherlands: The role of integration, host national identification and perceived 
discrimination. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 41(11): 1836-1857. 
Eastmond M (2006)Transnational returns and reconstruction in post-war Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. International Migration, 44(3):141-166. 
Emanuelsson AC (2008) Transnational Dynamics of Return and the Potential Role of the 
Kurdish Diaspora in Developing the Kurdish Region. Defence Academy of the United 
Kingdom, Conflict Studies Research Centre. 
Eriksson Baaz M (2015) Successive flops and occasional feats: development contributions 
and thorny social navigation among Congolese return migrants, in Akensson, L. and 
Eriksson-Baaz, M. (eds), Africa's return migrants: the new developers?, London: Zed 
Books Ltd, 23-43. 
Fehler BO (2011) (Re)constructing Roots: Genetics and the ‘Return’ of African Americans to 
Ghana. Mobilities, 6(4): 585-600. 
Fleischer A (2008) The role of the family for return migration, reintegration and re-
emigration in Armenia. In XXVII IUSSP International Population Conference. 
Retrieved from http://www. iussp. org/en/event/17/programme/paper/2411. 
Fokkema T and Haas H (2015) Pre-and Post-Migration Determinants of Socio-Cultural 
Integration of African Immigrants in Italy and Spain. International Migration, 53(6): 3-
26. 
Gerhartz E (2010) When Migrants Travel Back Home: Changing Identities in Northern Sri 
Lanka after the Ceasefire of 2002. Mobilities, 5(1): 147-165. 
Grabska K (2015) Threatening mini skirts: Returnee South Sudanese adolescent girls and 
social change’, in Akensson, L. and Eriksson-Baaz, M. (eds), Africa's return migrants: 
the new developers?, London: Zed Books Ltd. 
 36 
 Hassanpour, A & Mojab, S (2005) Kurdish Diaspora. In M. Ember, C. L. Ember & I. 
Skoggard (eds.) Encyclopedia of Diasporas. Part I. Immigrant and Refugee Cultures 
around the World. Springer Science + Business Media, Inc., 214-224. 
Ho Ele and Boyle M (2015) Migration-as-development repackaged? The globalizing 
imperative of the Singaporean state's diaspora strategies. Singapore Journal of Tropical 
Geography, 36(2): 164-182. 
Human Rights Watch. 1991. Whatever Happened to the Iraqi Kurds?. 
Iaria V (2014) Post-Return Transnationalism and the Iraqi Displacement in Syria and 
Jordan. International Migration, 52(6): 43-56. 
Irwani M (2015) Clientelism and Implementing Social Security Programmes in Post-conflict 
Iraqi Kurdistan Region. New Castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
Jain S (2013) For love and money: second-generation Indian-Americans ‘return’to 
India. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36(5): 896-914. 
Kaya Z & Whiting M (2017) Sowing Division: Kurds in the Syrian War. Middle East 
Policy, 24(1), 79-91. 
King D (2008) Back from the ‘Outside’: Returnees and Diasporic Imagining in Iraqi 
Kurdistan. International Journal on Multicultural Societies 10(2): 208-222.  
King R and Christou A (2011) Of counter-diaspora and reverse transnationalism: return 
mobilities to and from the ancestral homeland. Mobilities, 6(4): 451-466. 
King R and Christou A (2014) Second-Generation ‘Return’ to Greece: New Dynamics of 
Transnationalism and Integration. International Migration, 52(6): 85-99. 
Kunuroglu, F, Yagmur, K, Van De Vijver, FJ & Kroon, S (2017) Motives for Turkish return 
migration from Western Europe: home, sense of belonging, discrimination and 
transnationalism. Turkish Studies, 1-29. 
 37 
Leezenberg M (2005) Iraqi Kurdistan: Contours of a Post-Civil War Society. Third World 
Quarterly, 26(4): 631-647.  
Long LD and Oxfeld E eds (2004) Coming home?: refugees, migrants, and those who stayed 
behind. University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Markowitz F and Stefansson AH eds (2004) Homecomings: Unsettling paths of return. 
Lexington Books. 
McDowall, D (1996) A Modern History of the Kurds. New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 
Mhamad A (2015) The New Wave of Kurdish Migration. Your Middle East, 
http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/culture/the-new-wave-of-kurdish-migration_33858.  
Mortensen EB (2014) Not Just a Personal Decision. African Diaspora, 7(1): 15–37. 
Paasche E (2016a) The role of corruption in reintegration: Experiences of Iraqi Kurds upon 
return from Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42(7): 1076-1093. 
Paasche E (2016b) A Conceptual and Empirical Critique of ‘Social Remittances’: Iraqi 
Kurdish Migrants Narrate Resistance. In Nowicka, M. and Serbedzija, V. (eds.) 
Migration and Social Remittances in a Global Europe. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 121-
141. 
Saar M (2017) To return or not to return? The importance of identity negotiations for return 
migration. Social Identities, 1-14.  
Sinatti G (2015) Return migration as a win-win-win scenario? Visions of return among 
Senegalese migrants, the state of origin and receiving countries. Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, 38(2): 275-291. 
Toivanen M (2014) Negotiating home and belonging. Young Kurds in Finland. Turku: Turku 
University Press. 
 38 
Tsuda T (2009a) Why Does the Diaspora Return Home?. In Tsuda, T. (Ed.) Diasporic 
homecomings: Ethnic return migration in comparative perspective. California: Stanford 
University Press, 21-43. 
Tsuda T (2009b) Global inequities and diasporic return: Japanese American and Brazilian 
encounters with the ethnic homeland. In Tsuda, T. (Ed.) Diasporic homecomings: 
Ethnic return migration in comparative perspective. California: Stanford University 
Press, 227-259. 
Tuomi, J & Sarajärvi, A (2009) Laadullinen tutkimus ja sisällönanalyysi. Helsinki: Tammi. 
van Bruinessen M (2000) Transnational Aspects of the Kurdish Question. Working paper, 
Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies European University Institute. 
Van Houte M and Davids T (2008) Development and return migration: from policy panacea 
to migrant perspective sustainability. Third World Quarterly, 29(7): 1411-1429. 
van Houte M (2014) Returnees for change? Afghan return migrants' identification with the 
conflict and their potential to be agents of change. Conflict, Security & Development 
14(5): 565-591. 
van Meeteren M, Engbersen G, Snel E and Faber M (2014) Understanding different post-
return experiences. Comparative Migration Studies 2(3): 335-360. 
Voller Y (2014) The Kurdish liberation movement in Iraq: from insurgency to statehood. 
London: Routledge. 
 
Table 1 - Interviewees by age, year of departure and the country of settlement5 
 
                                                
5 Their date of return and the province that they currently live is not given for the purposes of 
anonymity. Our experience shows that these markers may make the interviewees identifiable.  
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 Age and gender (M/F) Year of departure Country of settlement 
1 29 (F) 1988 Canada 
2 26 (F) 1992 Canada 
3 60 (M) 1985 Denmark 
4 50 (M) 1986 Denmark 
5 35 (F) 1991 France 
6 33 (M) 1994 Germany 
7 46 (M) 1995 Germany 
8 50 (F) 1992 Germany 
9 40 (F) 1997 Germany 
10 60 (M) 1995 Germany 
11 45 (M) 1995 Germany 
12 48 (M) 1993 Germany 
13 58 (M) 1975 Russia 
14 35 (M) 1999 Sweden 
15 44 (F) 1975 Sweden 
16 30 (M) 1994 The Netherlands 
17 26 (F) 1999 The Netherlands 
18 27 (F) 1995 The Netherlands 
19 48 (M) 1997 The Netherlands 
20 60 (M) 1980 The Netherlands 
21 54 (M) 1993 The Netherlands 
22 34 (M) 2002 United Kingdom 
23 36 (M) 1998 United Kingdom 
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24 51 (M) 1996 USA 
25 38 (M) 1975 USA 
26 28 (F) 1988 USA 
 
 
